Theory of International Politics

The e-textbook format was less nimble than a regular Kindle e-book. Much of the core conceptual work is over two generations old and Waltz praises bipolarity with only passing regard for the Third World proxy conflicts that geopolitical maneuvering inspired, funded, and oversaw. He seems tone deaf to the foreign policy costs borne of the Vietnam War misadventure. Still, I found his opening chapters on the robustnes of theory insightful and his economic analogies throughoout very useful This was the first book that I have read as a doctoral candidate.

I bought this classical work, because I was interested in the structural realism and its main theoretical tenets. Although the book was written in the late 1970s, I still find the volume very relevant if one is interested – like me – to better understand the structural realist thought. (One could of course criticize Waltz for not discussing unipolarity at a greater length (instead we find a rather long discussion on multipolarity and bipolarity), but the book still has many interesting insights relevant for the modern world.) Waltz is very clear about that he is not providing a theory of foreign policy; he is interested in the workings of international politics and his explicit aim is to provide a general theory of international politics. One does not have to agree with Waltz’s arguments, but one surely can agree that it is an accessible, eloquent and persuasive work on the role of structure in the international politics. In my opinion it is a must-read volume for anyone who is interested in the international politics.

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This is a small, but dense book, not one that's easy to digest, but one that's worth the slog. It was referred to me as an essential book on international politics; one that lays out the theory of how contemporary analysts view international relations. Waltz is incisive, but organizational clarity is not his forte. To paraphrase, Waltz states the aims of this book is three fold: to review the field of international political theory, to construct his own theory, and to examine some applications of his theory. The first three or four chapters are dedicated to reviewing systematic and/or reductionist theories of international politics, as well as the theory of theory itself. Much of this material is a lengthy review of the scientific method as applied to the social sciences, and the shortcomings of building a theory for a 'soft' science, like international relations. If you're familiar with the issues, skimming through or even skipping over the early chapters, probably won't compromising your ability to follow the arguments he makes in the rest of the book. It is in the middle section of the book that Waltz develops his theory, which is structuralist. He contends that it is the structures of states: large, small; weak, powerful, etc which are more deterministic in international relations than the states' policy goals or intentions. He examines the internal and external forces that impede or propel nations in their dealings with one and another. Politics internal to nations, is the realm of laws and customs. Politics external to nations is the realm of 'might makes right.' Only to those nations that are on an equal footing with one another, is the notion of international laws somewhat applicable. Nations that are disadvantaged, suffer what they must at the pleasure of the more powerful. The point he makes is that these structural forces determine what actions or non-actions a nation can take and what results can be expected. Structures are sticky, and states are constrained by them. To elaborate on structure, Waltz compares the anarchy of international relations to the standard description of international relations: the pursuit of power balance. Waltz contends that balance of power alliances are a consequence of structure, not the result of policy. Survival of the state is paramount and states will form alliances with any other state that will improve its prospects for survival. Violence, or the threat of violence is the natural state of affairs in the international realm. Increasing international interdependence (through increased specialization) is a way to minimize the challenge of violence and increase economic advantage. This, however, is accomplished at the expense of forfeiting independence. Yet this loss of independence raises the threat of non-violent coercion. Thus, a balance between specializing to maximize efficiency on one hand, and the need to maintain skills and resources for credible response to potential threats on the other, must be met. Waltz points out that the interplay between micro and macro in economics has an underappreciated corollary with national and international policy. Small decisions at the national level play out into larger consequences at the international level. International policy thus follows national policy, as international agencies are not powerful enough to dictate national policy. In the relations between states, at one end of a continuum is anarchy and on the other is the hierarchy of governance (the UN, trade agreements, etc.). These international agencies are often believed to be structural in nature, but in reality they are the process of international policy, as these agencies have no authority of enforcement. All states develop a mix of acceptance levels for anarchy and hierarchy. The behavior of states in the lawless international realm is characterized by 'realpolitik,' where interest and necessity are the guiding pursuits. Waltz's system theory of balance of power is built up from the micro motivations, the actions and interactions of the states. He concludes that the only requirement for the emergence of balance of power outcomes is that the international order be anarchic and the states populating it all wish for their survival. Security and stability is the goal of balancing behavior. Increase in, or maximization of power is not necessarily desired, but maintaining position in the system is. International politics is a competitive realm. Competition tends toward sameness and socialization to the system. When internal resources are inadequate, competitors may need to turn for assistance from others. Assessing international structure becomes an issue determining poles: bipolar or multipolar, as well as determining the power basis - economic, political, and militaristic - of the allied states. States are ranked by size of population, size of territory, available resources, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence. To be powerful, a state traditionally would need to be strong in all; today that is not the case. Changes in these rankings effects the poles and the balances of power. Recognizing a parallel between the economics of firms and the relations of states, Waltz details how the international realm is characterized by the law of small numbers. The state of affairs for a large number of equal units (states or firms) leads to either anarchy or centralized despotism, and often oscillating between these two extremes. A small number of large units with many more lesser ones leads to less volatility. Collusion and bargaining promotes stability, and collusion and bargaining become easier with smaller numbers. While in economics the law of small numbers has the undesired effect of benefiting producers at the expense of consumers, in the international realm, it is a desired effect. It is generally accepted that increasing interdependence between states improves stability. Waltz concludes otherwise. Much depends on the definition of the term, Waltz seeing it as the level of sensitivity between states, not the generally accepted 'dependence' between states. Per Waltz's definition, if the growth of interdependence outpaces the development of governmental or structural control, then the conditions exist for increased volatility. If smaller numbers are better, what number is optimal? Waltz concludes the answer is two. Interdependence breeds hostility and fear. In multipolar systems, worries abound about the strength and combinations of others. While with bipolar systems, the importance of alliances is lessened, increasing each party's reliance upon more reliable internal resources, rather than depending on external balancing. In multipolar systems, who is a danger to whom is always uncertain. In bipolar systems, who is a danger is never in doubt. Competitors in bipolar systems evolve to become more like each other. With less interdependence, greater certainty of threats exists, along with like areas of understanding, lessening volatility and increasing stability. In power politics, the action forces the players into two rival blocks, but members continue to vie for advantages and to worry about changing alliances. If each block has a member of overwhelming strength, a bipolar system of two great powers emerges. In the early going of this book, Waltz employs few historical references, making for difficulty in visualizing his concepts. In the later chapters, which are the most pertinent and of the most value in this book, he does reference history and current states extensively. Keep in mind that this book was published after the Vietnam War, but ten years before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, he does make some prescient predictions about Europe and China that are not far from what has transpired. Waltz offers many insights into the nature of power, force, and strength in the realm of international affairs. His overall point is that despite national interests and policy intentions, it is the relative strength of states that determines the structure of international relations and which channels the course of foreign policy

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Waltz’ view, forty years after the writing Theory of International Politics, a scholar of international relations will still have to deal with his arguments. His reconstruction of realism became the baseline against which new contenders such as Robert Keohane and Alexander Wendt would have to argue. Personally, I have come to appreciate the apparent simplicity and parsimony of his argument, but more importantly, his theory sets an example of how one would go about constructing a theory of International Relations.

We used this book in a couple of my classes while studying for my MA in International Relations. Waltz was a leading thinker and theorist and I am glad that I studied his material and ideas.

This books adds to Waltz's other theories on international relations. Developing from the book Man, State and War. Expounding upon first image, second image and third image of nations. It is a must read for those International Relations graduate students or Political Science Majors.

To illuminate the puzzle of why states form alliances with other states, if they (according to his theory) are necessarily "selfish", Waltz first makes the necessary distinction between domestic and international politics. This distinction is necessary so that Waltz can show us how alliance formation follows a fundamentally different logic in an anarchic system than it does in a system with some form of central authority (hierarchy) like the state, because the state monopolizes legitimate violence, so that a domestic system is not self-help - one can appeal to the state for defense. While it is debatable that all or even the majority of states have enjoyed a true monopoly on legitimate violence throughout history, we must grant Waltz this axiom if the remainder of his arguments are to hold. Waltz then takes the domestic/international comparison into the realm of economics and interdependence, arguing that within the state, actors are "free to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased interdependence that goes with specialization" (104). Because the state guarantees security, all can be most concerned with their own (absolute) gains. However, in a self-help system, worries about survival in anarchy make units more concerned with relative gains. States do not want to be dependent on other states, which hinders the benefits of specialization. Interdependence, instead of enriching all, becomes a threat to survival, because it creates vulnerability. This is a result of the structure of the anarchic system, despite the best intentions of those who want cooperation. "Structures cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have" (107). Thus, the only thing that can change these effects is structural change. Against those who would argue that the international system is not a pure anarchy because we see alliances, Waltz would argue that they confuse structure with process. He does admit that states sometimes cooperate, obviously, but "only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system" (116). The primary way of doing this, captured by balance-of-power theory, is "moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one" (118). Interestingly, Waltz claims that his theory does not require rationality on the part of the actors - they simply emulate more successful rivals, or else they perish. Thus, "balances of power tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance" (119). Why should we expect to see alliances balancing one another, as opposed to bandwagoning onto a winning alliance? Again, the structural logic does the explanatory work. Because the international system is self-help, "balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones" (126). In other words, nobody wants anybody except themselves to "win", and so states gang up against a likely winner, meaning that the structure induces security (not power per se) as the primary concern. Waltz even characterizes this induction as a kind of sociological process, positing that the "socialization" of nonconformist states (he gives the Soviets as an example) is inevitable, given that isolationism is not an option: "one party may need the assistance of others. Refusal to play the political game may risk one's own destruction" (128). For Waltz, then, the only important changes are structural ones. Since anarchy will not disappear, the only structural changes that can happen is changes in the distribution of state capabilities. Given that Waltz has solved the puzzle of alliances and balancing by showing how they are structurally necessary if states hope to survive, he then goes on to link changes in the distribution of state power with the question of the likely configuration(s) of alliances that will arise from these changes. In order to do so, he first establishes how to measure power and "polarity" (number of alliances/powers in the system). After rather sarcastically rebutting critics who think the world is not bipolar, and arguing that his theory boils down to "common sense", Waltz predictably defines power as the total and combined distribution of material capabilities across states, meaning that only the U.S. and the Soviet Union qualify. For Waltz, this bipolarity is a normatively good thing, because his argument touts its peace-enhancing characteristics. Since interdependence is dangerous, and since interdependence decreases as the number of powers decreases, security is enhanced, and uncertainty is reduced. Waltz even goes so far as to claim: "now governments are more involved in their national economies than they are internationally. This is fortunate" (159). The key point to highlight here, for Waltz's theory of alliances, is that alliances are formed and balanced in response to structural conditions. Preferences, costs and benefits to individual states do not matter, because the structural properties of unitary states, anarchy, and the distribution of power determine the configuration that assures outcomes. If the distribution of power happens to be in a certain configuration, meaning that states only make gains or losses relative to that overall distribution, then the likely resulting alliance pattern is pre-ordained. Any "deviant" path taken by any state will result in certain defeat for that state, and thus states will avoid taking this path in the first place. Of course, rationalist or strategic choice theorists would say that Waltz neglects the role of calculation and doesn't provide microfoundations, while constructivists would proclaim that Waltz ignores the role of identity. However, by ignoring these (probably important) factors, Waltz reaps a large payoff in terms of parsimony and explanatory leverage.